Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful For Preventing Sudden Stops? A Quantitative Investigation Of The Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff
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| Google books | books.google.com |
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| Originally published | 2005 |
| Authors | Enrique G. Mendoza |
| Ceyhun Bora Durdu | |
| Date of Reg. | |
| Date of Upd. | |
| ID | 2180369 |
About Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful For Preventing Sudden Stops? A Quantitative Investigation Of The Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff
An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral hazard. . . .